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EMMA L. FAIRBANKS, MARIA L. TANG, ELLEN BROOKS-POLLOCK, LOUISE DYSON, CHRIS J. BUDD,5
REBECCA B. HOYLE, LARS SCHEWE, JULIA R. GOG⇤, AND MICHAEL J. TILDESLEY⇤6
Abstract. In this paper we present work on SARS-CoV-2 transmission in UK higher education settings using
multiple approaches to assess the extent of university outbreaks, how much those outbreaks may have led to
spillover in the community, and the expected effects of control measures. Firstly, we found that the distribution
of outbreaks in universities in late 2020 were consistent with the expected importation of infection from arriving
students. Considering outbreaks at one university, larger halls of residence posed higher risks for transmission.
The dynamics of transmission from university outbreaks to wider communities is complex, and while sometimes
spillover does occur, occasionally even large outbreaks do not give any detectable signal of spillover to the local
population. Secondly, we explored proposed control measures for reopening and keeping open universities. We
found the proposal of staggering the return of students to university residence is of limited value in terms of
reducing transmission. We show that student adherence to testing and self-isolation are likely to be much more
important for reducing transmission during term time. Finally we explored strategies for testing students in the
context of a more transmissible variant and found that frequent testing would be necessary to prevent a major
outbreak.
1. Introduction7
The global spread of SARS-CoV-2 has resulted in widespread usage of social distancing measures and non-8
pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to inhibit the spread of infection. Enactment of nationwide lockdowns9
has resulted in the closure of workplaces, pubs and restaurants, restricted leisure activities and impacted the10
education sector.11
Measures brought in when entering the first nationwide lockdown in the UK in March 2020 included closure12
of Higher Education establishments, such as universities, to most in-person activities. Face-to-face teaching13
was mostly suspended, with delivery of the remainder of the 2019/2020 academic year taking place via online14
delivery.15
Higher education in the UK comprises a sizeable population of students, with over 2.3 million higher education16
students enrolled in the 2018/2019 academic year across over 160 higher education providers [20] (universities,17
essentially). This results in a sizeable movement of students nationwide at the beginning and end of academic18
terms (in addition to international student travel). In the context of an ongoing disease outbreak, the migration19
of students can contribute to increased population mobility, with an associated need for careful management in20
order to minimise the risk of seeding outbreaks both in universities and in the wider community.21
Ahead of the 2020/2021 academic year, there was significant uncertainty around whether students would22
be able to return to face-to-face teaching and what policies would be put in place in order to mitigate risk.23
This prompted action to build a foundation of knowledge such that appropriate policies could be put in place24
to facilitate students returning safely to universities. From 15th to 17th June 2020, a Virtual Study Group25
on ‘Unlocking Higher Education Spaces’ was hosted by the Virtual Forum for Knowledge Exchange in the26
Mathematical Sciences (V-KEMS), looking at how mathematical approaches could inform the reopening of27
higher education spaces to students whilst minimising risk. A working paper was subsequently released in July28
2020 [58].29
Building on the discussion that took place at the June Study Group, two virtual events (taking place on 28th30
July 2020 and 4th August 2020, respectively) investigated the application of mathematical tools and models to31
various issues linked to the challenges of reopening higher education. These events were run as part of the Isaac32
Newton Institute Infectious Dynamics of Pandemics Research Programme [24]. After these events, a working33
group continued to meet virtually on a weekly basis, consisting of participants from several institutions.34
Mathematical modelling approaches informed by data, have been a valuable tool used to inform policy35
decisions linked to the subsequent operation of Higher Education in the midst of a pandemic. In order to guide36
these decisions, in this paper we have investigated contributing factors to within-institution spread and how37
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Figure 1. Overview over the structure of the article.
transmission interplays with the wider community. This study starts with a set of observational analyses based38
on data from the first term of the 2020/2021 academic year. This is followed by prospective modelling of control39
measures under consideration for the full return of UK Higher Education students in the future.40
The work presented in this paper is the outcome of bringing together the expertise from these multiple research41
groups, and pooling our analyses using both statistical and modelling methods. Several conclusions emerge from42
this work both in understanding the observations from Autumn 2020, and also making recommendations for43
future actions:44
(1) The overall distribution of outbreaks in universities in autumn term 2020 were consistent with expected45
importations from taking a student intake from the wider community, so that universities reflect the46
community disease prevalence at the start of term.47
(2) Larger halls of residence pose higher risks for larger attack rates, and segmentation into smaller households48
within halls is unlikely to be able to mitigate this.49
(3) The picture of transmission from universities to their local communities is complex. While spillover50
inevitably can occur, sometimes even large outbreaks in universities do not give any corresponding signal51
in their wider neighbouring communities.52
(4) The proposed strategy of staggering future returns appears to be of somewhat mixed and limited value.53
While it could reduce the need for self-isolation on return under low prevalence, these benefits could be54
diminished or even reversed in the context of high background prevalence.55
(5) While a staggered return could reduce the peak of any outbreak during term, staggering on its own will56
not substantially reduce the total attack rate over a whole term: staggering may act mainly to delay the57
outbreak to later in the term.58
(6) The level of student adherence to testing and isolation is likely to have a far larger effect than any59
subtleties between different staggered return regimes.60
(7) While it is likely that asymptomatic testing programs did help to prevent large outbreaks in university61
settings in Autumn 2020, extremely frequent testing (every 3 days) would be needed to prevent a major62
outbreak under plausible parameters for the B.1.1.7 variant.63
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we summarise the understanding64
and learning from the observed patterns of SARS-CoV-2 from Autumn term 2020, looking at the dynamics of65
wider community transmission including the importation of cases to universities at the start of term, and the66
spillover of transmissions from universities to the wider community during the course of the term. This section67
also looks at the dependence on the infection dynamics within universities of the structures of halls of residence68
and student households. In Section 3 we look at several exploratory models for the future return of students, in69
particular looking at the impact of different strategies for staggering this return, and of asymptomatic testing on70
return. In Section 4 we draw some further conclusions from this work and make some policy recommendations.71
For a more detailed overview, see Figure 1.72
2. Observations from Autumn term 202073
Higher Education institutions in the UK largely reopened to students for the 2020/2021 academic year. This74
led to an influx of students from across the UK and world, brought together in residential, academic and social75
settings. In the first term, under the government advice at the time [7], most Higher Education establishments76
offered blended online and face-to-face learning. Prior to the beginning of the academic year, students resident77
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in housing of multiple occupancy — and in particular students in residential halls — were identified as being at78
high risk of transmitting SARS-CoV-2 infection [2, 47].79
The return of students to universities in the autumn term occurred at a time when SARS-CoV-2 cases80
were growing in the UK. Local lockdowns came into force in areas with greatest risk leading to an increase in81
restrictions on travel, business openings and between-household socialising. In addition, countrywide lockdowns82
were imposed in Wales from 23rd October 2020 to 9th November 2020 and in England from 5th November 202083
to 2nd December 2020. Many universities offered testing regimes in an attempt to further control outbreaks.84
In an attempt to segment interactions and reduce transmission risk within halls, many universities assigned85
students in residential halls to households based on the use of shared facilities such as kitchens and bathrooms86
under government guidance [7]. These households were intended to function similarly to households in the87
community; with many restrictions on socialising beyond these household members, and requirements for the88
entire household to isolate for up to 14 days if a member displayed symptoms of COVID-19 or received a positive89
SARS-CoV-2 test. Despite the control measures taken, outbreaks of varying sizes were seen in many UK Higher90
Education institutions in the first term, prompting concern about the possibility of spillover into the community.91
In this section, we use data from the first term of the 2020/2021 academic year to investigate the factors92
that may have contributed to the observed outbreaks within Higher Education institutions and to examine any93
evidence of further transmission between Higher Education institutions and the wider community. Firstly, we94
consider the mass migration of students from across the UK at the beginning of term and how well this may95
explain the occurrence of outbreaks seen across universities (Section 2.1). We then use data available from a96
particular university and investigate the role of accommodation structure upon transmission, by considering the97
relationship of residential hall sizes and household sizes within halls to attack rates (Section 2.2). To investigate98
spillover from Higher Education to the community, we investigate case data by age (henceforth "age-stratified")99
from areas very close to English universities to determine whether there is any evidence of spillover from student100
age groups to other age groups (Section 2.3). We also consider total case data stratified across a wider spatial101
scale to search for signs of spillover from areas with a high concentration of student residents to geographically102
nearby areas without high concentrations of students (Section 2.4).103
2.1. Start of term: transmission from the community104
Although many universities experienced outbreaks at the beginning of the 2020/2021 academic year, there105
was significant variation in the number of confirmed SARS-CoV-2 cases between institutions. We explore the106
extent to which the estimated incoming numbers of infected students could explain the observed distribution of107
outbreaks in the early weeks of the autumn term across UK universities.108
2.1.1. Data and methods. To estimate the number of incoming infected students for each university at the109
beginning of the 2020/2021 academic year, we combined Office for National Statistics (ONS) infection survey110
data on the proportion of the community testing positive (prevalence) via PCR to SARS-CoV-2 by region with111
data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) on home and term-time postcodes for the 2018/2019112
cohort of students [12]. Infected student numbers at the start of term were estimated based on PCR-positive113
prevalence at their home postcodes on 25 September 2020, and rounded to the nearest integer. It was assumed114
that international students from countries with high case numbers would be placed in effective quarantine and115
were thus discounted for the purpose of this analysis. Outbreak data were drawn from the University and College116
Union (UCU) dashboard in November 2020 [52]. After omitting data with obvious quality issues, data for 72117
universities were available. We defined a large outbreak as 200 or more cumulative cases reported on the UCU118
dashboard by the 18th or 19th November 2020 (these case numbers obtained relate to various dates in November119
since updates were not daily or uniform).120
To estimate the probability of a large outbreak, universities were binned by the estimated number of PCR-121
positive students in bin widths of 10, and the fraction of universities in each bin that experienced an outbreak122
was calculated based on the observed data.123
We also considered a simple probabilistic model for the outbreak probability P based only on incoming124
PCR-positive students, P = 1  pn, where n corresponds to the initial number of PCR-positive students, and the125
extinction probability, p, is the probability that an incoming infection fails to seed an outbreak. The probabilities126
of each incoming infection seeding an outbreak are assumed to be independent of each other. The extinction127
probability, p, was inferred via maximum likelihood from the observed outbreak data (see Appendix A).128
2.1.2. Results. The observed fraction of universities experiencing an outbreak appeared to be broadly consistent129
with the simple probabilistic model (Fig. 2), with a fitted extinction probability of p = 0.958 (95% confidence130
interval [0.945, 0.972]). Repeating the analysis and fitting the simple model using a more stringent threshold131
of 400 cases returned an extinction probability estimate of p = 0.979 (95% confidence interval [0.971, 0.987]),132
with the model estimations following the trend of the observed data. These results lend cautious support to133
the hypothesis that the observed pattern of outbreaks at universities was consistent with that expected from134
importation from the student intake.135
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Figure 2. Observed fraction of institutions having an outbreak (*), binned by expected number of
incoming cases, and theoretical outbreak probability P (solid line): for a threshold of 200 cases (left)
and 400 cases (right).
This would imply that outbreaks are more likely when case numbers in the incoming student population136
are higher (higher n leads to higher outbreak probability P). Similarly if the extinction probability, p, i.e. the137
probability of the chain of infection originating from a single introduction dying out, were lower then the overall138
outbreak probability P would be higher. Less effective infection control measures or a more transmissible variant139
might lead to a lower p, but this needs to be investigated further.140
2.1.3. Limitations. Factors that we did not take into account in this simple initial analysis and that could be141
explored further include: the detailed timeline of importations and onward transmissions, the likelihood that an142
outbreak might be the sum of smaller outbreaks caused by independent introductions, the rate of assimilation143
of local prevalence in newly arrived students, the impact of heterogeneous university characteristics such the144
number of commuting students, and the impact of heterogeneity in university infection control measures.145
In addition, we were limited by the availability of data; ideally the analysis should be repeated with146
contemporary student numbers and home regions, and with more consistent data on university case numbers.147
In light of these limitations, the precise numerical value of the fitted extinction probability should not be148
interpreted literally. However the fact that the extinction probability appears to be high suggests that the149
majority of infection chains die out before sparking an outbreak. This may be partly because COVID-19 is150
highly overdispersed [11] so that only a small proportion of infections lead to further cases, while many people151
with the disease do not infect anyone else. It may also reflect effective infection control measures in universities,152
or that there were fewer incoming infections than assumed in the model, perhaps because students who were153
unwell may have delayed their return to university, or because estimates of the prevalence via PCR-testing154
includes people who are in the late stages of infection and no longer infectious.155
2.2. Infection risk in residential student halls156
Prior to the resumption of the 2020/2021 academic year there was limited data to relate transmission risk157
within halls and their households to that estimated for community households. Here we examine factors predicting158
risk of infection amongst students in halls of residence at a single university. We refer to the secondary attack159
rate (SAR) in a sub-population (e.g. household, hall of residence) as the probability that a member of the160
sub-population is infected following infection of one sub-population member.161
2.2.1. Data. Data on hall capacity for 19 halls managed by the university, and the assignment of rooms within162
these into households of up to 16 members, were collected prior to the start of term. Stock data on room types for163
each hall was used to estimate the fraction of students sharing bathroom facilities with at least one other student164
for each hall and in each household. During term, students were encouraged to report confirmed SARS-CoV-2165
infection via a web form, including information about their place of residence, date of test result and subject.166
Preliminary enrollment data for 2020/2021 by subject and term time residence were used to estimate the fraction167
of students in each hall enrolled in the Medical Faculty (as a proxy for students who may be at higher risk of168
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Table 1. Coefficients, and associated p-value and standard error for final logistic regression models for
the hall SAR.
Covariate Coefficient p-value Std. error
Hall size 0.0037 <0.0001 0.00006
Proportion shared bathroom 0.4738 <0.0001 0.1166
Constant  3.1466 <0.0001 0.2235
Table 2. Expected impact of increasing hall capacity (Size) and proportion of students sharing a
bathroom (Shared) on the hall SAR (95% CI) from the final multivariate logistic regression in Table 1.
Size
Shared 0% 50% 100%
100 0.06(0.04-0.08) 0.07(0.06-0.09) 0.09(0.07-0.11)
200 0.08(0.07-0.10) 0.10(0.09-0.12) 0.13(0.11-0.14)
400 0.16(0.13-0.19) 0.19(0.17-0.22) 0.23(0.20-0.27)
Table 3. Coefficients, and associated p-value and standard error for final regression models for the
probability of introduction into a household and household SAR.
Covariate Coefficient p-value Std. error
Binary logistic regression: probability of infection in household
Household size 0.1623 <0.001 0.0269
Constant 1.847 <0.001 0.2510
Logistic regression: household SAR
Date of first infection  0.1485 <0.0001 0.0298
Proportion shared bathroom 0.9500 0.0021 0.3091
Constant  1.4028 0.0019 0.4524
infection due to placements). Approximately half of students reported a room number in addition to identifying169
their hall of residence, which enabled these reported infections to be grouped into pre-assigned households of170
known size.171
2.2.2. Methods. We tested for predictors of the SAR in a hall using multivariate logistic regression. We included172
median household size, proportion of students in medical courses, hall size, and the proportion of students173
sharing a bathroom with one or more students as covariates.174
We used binomial logistic regression on the binary data indicating the presence of at least one infection in each175
household to estimate the probability that infection is reported by household size. We estimated the binomial176
probability of secondary infections in a household. We also considered multivariate logistic regression performed177
with covariates of household size, time between start of term and date of first reported test in the household, and178
proportion in the household sharing a bathroom. We aggregated household data across halls and only included179
reports that were associated with symptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection, to avoid bias in time between start of180
term and date of first reported test in the household from asymptomatic testing programs.181
We repeated each multi-variate regression while at least one predictor was not significant, dropping the182
predictor with the lowest t-value. We performed the statistical analyses using the general purpose mathematical183
programming language Matlab [49] (logistical analysis) or statistical data analysis software Genstat [60] (binary184
logistical analysis).185
2.2.3. Results.186
Reported confirmed attack rate by hall. While all covariates listed in Table 7 were significant in a univariate187
analysis (Appendix B), only hall size and proportion of students sharing a bathroom were associated with SAR in188
the final multivariate regression (Table 1). We provide the predicted impact of hall capacity and the proportion189
sharing bathrooms in Table 2. This indicated that students in halls where they all share a bathroom with at190
least one other (Shared=100%) are approximately 50% more likely to become infected than students in halls191
with all en-suite rooms (Shared=0%). Increasing the hall capacity from 100 to 400 students increased each192
student’s probability of becoming infected by approximately 167%.193
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Our results — with the caveat that they are subject to any bias in confirming and reporting infection — suggest194
that infection risk in large residential settings is difficult to mitigate by segmenting students into households,195
and the risk of living in large residential settings is exacerbated by the use of shared bathrooms. It is possible196
that our covariates are proxies for other properties of the setting that influence student mixing (e.g. other types197
of shared spaces, ventilation, etc.). Furthermore, it is likely that effect sizes will vary between settings depending198
on importation of cases, characteristics of the local epidemic and local testing facilities, and propensity to adhere199
to guidance on isolation and mixing restrictions. However, interpreted at face value, our results suggest that200
only partially filling student residential halls could significantly reduce transmission risk, especially if this is201
coordinated to reduce shared spaces.202
Infection risk within hall households. Unsurprisingly, the probability of at least one reported symptomatic203
infection in a household was significantly correlated with household size (Table 3); the expected probability of204
importation into a household of size 16 was 0.68, approximately double the probability for a household of size 8.205
38% of households reported at least one infection.206
Household size does not reach significance in the regression model for household SAR in the univariate or207
multivariate analysis, consistent with estimates of community household SAR for households from population208
level data [30]. For the multivariate regression we find that SAR was higher for households with the first209
reported case earlier in the term (Table 3). This has many possible drivers such as changes in local background210
prevalence, shifts in contact or reporting behaviour, or the impact of local depletion of susceptible individuals211
owing to immunity or students vacating term time residences. Our analysis of this data set does not allow us to212
distinguish between these possibilities. Multivariate regression also indicated the SAR was positively correlated213
with the proportion of shared bathrooms in the household. The first reported infection in a hall household214
occurred six days after the start of term. At this stage of the term our predicted household SAR is 0.09 (95%215
CI: 0.05-0.16) and 0.21 (95% CI: 0.14-0.30) in households with all en-suite rooms and all rooms with shared216
bathrooms, respectively.217
Although the vast majority of test results within a household were dated within 14 days of the first reported218
positive, and therefore plausibly epidemiologically linked, we did not have any contact tracing or situational219
data that could be used to investigate this. We have not estimated overdispersion in the number of secondary220
household cases which may be relevant [51]. While our estimates of the SAR early in term are broadly consistent221
with community household SAR [e.g. 30, 31], the binomial probability of reporting a symptomatic infection222
given a previously reported symptomatic infection in a household over the entire term is lower: 0.058 (95%223
CI: 0.043-0.070) or 0.076 (95% CI: 0.064-0.090) considering all reported positive tests. However our data on224
secondary household infections is incomplete due to missing data on household membership and uncertain225
propensity to report test results (including any time and household dependence of this). Follow up testing of226
household members for markers of historic infection in serum samples is likely required to estimate the full227
extent of household transmission.228
It is highly plausible that not all infections in a household arise from a single imported case. In Appendix B229
we consider the role of infection within the hall on the household SAR using a simple transmission model that230
allows for infectious contact between household members and between hall members. Results indicate the extent231
extra-household contacts in the hall may inflate estimate of the SAR; in this model the mean probability of232
infection due to random contact within the hall is 0.047, whereas the probability of infection from an individual in233
the same household is 0.091 (see Appendix B). In reality, students will also mix with students in other residential234
settings and with the wider community – we explore evidence for the latter in the following section.235
2.3. Transmission to/from the community: comparison to local age groups236
Following a series of large outbreaks among the university student population in the 2020/2021 academic year,237
a question of interest to both policy-makers and the general public was the extent to which these outbreaks238
affected the wider local communities. This question remains of importance for any future large-scale returns239
of students to their campuses, and provides insight into the extent to which cluster outbreaks impact nearby240
populations.241
In this section we examine spillover, the impact of outbreaks in student populations on the surrounding242
communities, by analysing patterns of cases amongst the student population and the local community. In243
practice, as student populations are interlinked with the wider community, transmission can be in either direction.244
In addition to any NPIs in place, and adherence thereto, the existence and strength of any spillover signal will245
likely depend on factors such as: the magnitude of the student outbreak, the levels of newly reported cases246
(incidence) in the community at the time of the outbreak, and the proportion of students who originally resided247
in close geographic proximity to the university.248
2.3.1. Data and methods. We used age-stratified positive case data at the Lower Tier Local Authority (LTLA)249
level from a Public Health England (PHE) line list to describe the trends in student-aged case numbers. Our250
analysis also used cumulative incidence data as reported by the respective universities, or via the University and251
College Union (UCU) COVID-19 dashboard [52]. Cumulative case counts from both data sources were used as252
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measures of the outbreak sizes. Calculations of these sizes were limited to 10 days past the peak in student-aged253
cases in order to facilitate comparisons across all LTLAs.254
The age-stratified line list data for those aged 18-24 was used as a proxy for “student cases”, with cases among255
all other age groups being classified as “community cases”. To facilitate comparison across age groups, we rescaled256
all quantities by the known populations of each LTLA using data from ONS [40].257
We include a sample of LTLAs with a notable proportion of students in Table 4 as an illustration of the258
variability across England. For each LTLA, we examined if, following an outbreak in the student population, (a)259
there was an appreciable increase in the growth rate of community cases, and (b) if more community cases than260
expected were recorded in the subsequent 10 days.261
The time-varying growth rate in cases was estimated by taking the derivative of a smoother applied to the262
daily case data. This method, while accounting for overdispersion in the data, also estimated a mean daily263
incidence (see Appendix C for more details).264
Upon infection, a host triggers progeny infections following a period termed the generation time. Changes to265
the community growth rate (a) were regarded as temporally linked with a student outbreak if such significant266
changes occurred within two generation times (approximately 10 days [13]). Cases in excess of the expected267
daily incidence were used as a proxy for (b).268
Table 4. Properties of each of the considered LTLAs. Local students refers to those students
domiciled in the same English region, as obtained from the Higher Education Statistics Agency. The
community prevalence was obtained at the regional level from the ONS [36], looking at the transition
from 15/09/2020 to 15/10/2020. Multiple return dates arise from those LTLAs which host multiple
universities.
LTLA English region Local students ONS prevalence (%) Return dates
Birmingham West Midlands 52.8% 0.08 ! 0.79 21/09
Bristol South West 23.3% 0.08 ! 0.30 21/09 & 05/10
Durham North East 15.4% 0.34 ! 1.24 05/10
Exeter South West 32.0% 0.08 ! 0.30 14/09
Leeds Yorkshire & The Humber 38.7% 0.25 ! 1.51 28/09
Manchester North West 50.0% 0.44 ! 1.83 14/09 & 21/09
Newcastle North East 45.7% 0.34 ! 1.24 28/09
Nottingham East Midlands 32.1% 0.13 ! 0.69 21/09
Oxford South East 37.1% 0.09 ! 0.43 05/10
Salford North West 76.6% 0.44 ! 1.83 14/09
Sheffield Yorkshire & The Humber 39.3% 0.25 ! 1.51 28/09
York Yorkshire & The Humber 33.3% 0.25 ! 1.51 28/09
2.3.2. Results. The degree to which the growth rate of community cases changed following a student-aged269
outbreak varied significantly across the studied LTLAs. A selection of the different observed patterns are included270
in Appendix C.271
Fig. 3 shows a diverse pattern of spillover, and lack thereof, across different English LTLAs. Unsurprisingly,272
some of the universities with the largest outbreaks were situated in LTLAs which simultaneously had higher273
levels of incidence in the community.274
Larger outbreaks correlate with a greater degree of spillover, although this effect is more strongly seen when275
considering cases among 18-to-24-year-olds in Fig. 3b compared to using reported student outbreak sizes in276
Fig. 3a. However, there are exceptions to this pattern, and there is not a clear formal relationship between277
spillover and outbreak size.278
Although we consider two separate data sources to gauge campus outbreaks (self-reported or age-stratified),279
the discussion below uses outbreak sizes from Fig. 3a. At lower levels of community incidence, we observe280
two scenarios: in the first, a small outbreak with little apparent impact on the community. In the second, an281
outbreak in excess of 1200 cases with the largest observed impact on the community. In this latter case, the282
impact was larger in relative terms, but not necessarily in absolute terms (net increase in community cases).283
No clear relationship is apparent between the proportion of local students and excess community cases.284
Some large outbreaks (in excess of 1750) took place with relatively low levels of excess community cases. It is285
hypothesised that the asymptomatic testing strategy in place at the university in question may have played a286
role in this outcome.287
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(a) Cumulative university student outbreak sizes up to 10 days
past peak incidence, reported by the UCU.
(b) Cumulative university-aged outbreak sizes from 14 days
prior to 10 days past peak incidence, reported by PHE.
Figure 3. Relative excess of community cases in relation to the reported outbreak sizes across the
LTLAs considered in Table 4. The sizes of the plot markers scale with the proportion of students
attending a university in the same region as their home address. The colours of the markers correspond
to the community incidence per 1000 people in each LTLA at the time of peak student-aged cases.
These inform the varying levels of community prevalence prior to any student outbreak potentially
impacting the community.
2.3.3. Limitations. Student populations are interlinked with the wider community, whereby transmission can288
occur in either direction. For a given outbreak then, purely from case data it may not be possible to determine289
whether or not a student population caused or exacerbated an outbreak in the community. Our findings on290
spillover here are therefore limited to correlations between the growth in positive cases amongst the student-aged291
population and the community.292
Particular care should be taken when interpreting the relative timings of increased growth rates as done in293
Appendix C, as community cases rose in England during the autumn. In general, our results are limited by the294
available data, the sample of studied LTLAs, and our chosen indicators of spillover. While the chosen age groups295
represent those most likely to be students (ages 18-24) and members of the wider community (ages 0-17 and296
25+), these age ranges fail to account for older students, and those aged 18–24 who are not in higher education.297
Since the analysis is based on confirmed cases, our findings are predicated on consistent testing availability298
and uptake. Significant changes to these over the studied time period may have impacted our conclusions. The299
values in Fig. 3 should not be taken as predictive of the impact a student outbreak will have on the wider300
community. Overall, signals of spillover are not consistent in type (growth rate or excess) or strength across301
the studied LTLAs. As such, there does not from the data appear to be a simple set of criteria which can be302
established to determine the risk to the community from a university outbreak.303
While our observations suggest that spillover of cases from the university-aged population to the wider304
community likely does occur, this analysis does not consider transmission settings, e.g. residential, social, or305
educational.306
2.4. Transmission to/from the community: spatial patterns307
To complement the previous section’s spillover analysis based on age-bands, here we investigate relationships308
between the number of cases in areas (middle super output areas, or MSOAs, which are statistical reporting309
regions in England an Wales typically containing 5,000-10,000 people) with a large concentration of students,310
and areas that are near or far from those student areas.311
2.4.1. Data and methods. To estimate the proportion of the population within any given MSOA composed of312
HE students, we used information on the number of people reporting being students in each MSOA from the313
2011 UK census [38], and 2019 mid-year population estimates from the Office for National Statistics [40]. For314
weekly new case counts by MSOA we used the public UK government coronavirus data portal [44]. We derived315
MSOA centroids from the Office for National Statistics geographic data [39].316
We defined an MSOA as high student concentration if the number of students reported in 2011 is at least317
15% of the 2019 population estimate, and low student concentration if this figure was below 5%. We classified318
an MSOA as near a high student concentration MSOA if it was not itself a high student concentration MSOA319
but its centroid was within 2km of the centroid of such an MSOA, and far otherwise. We plotted time-series of320
test-positive cases per population by week for these categories of MSOA in several local authorities.321
2.4.2. Results. We find a very mixed picture across different local authorities hosting HE providers across322
England, and show several examples in Fig. 4. In particular, we see some signal of spillover in the case of323
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Figure 4. Mean cases (represented as dots) per population in MSOAs categorised as high student
concentration (black), near high student concentration (red), low student concentration (blue), and
far from high student concentration (green) in each of (A) Manchester, (B) Birmingham, and (C)
Hull. Lines represent the smoothed weekly mean positive cases per population, shaded to cover the
95% confidence intervals of these estimates (details in Appendix C)
Manchester (Fig. 4A), where the MSOAs near high concentration student areas experienced a rise and peak in324
cases following a rise and peak in high concentration student areas that is visibly distinct from the pattern for325
areas that are far from student areas. In contrast, in Birmingham (Fig. 4B) we see a rise and peak in cases in high326
concentration student areas, but no distinction between the visible patterns for MSOAs near high-concentration327
student areas or those further away. In the case of Hull (Fig. 4C), we see no obvious distinction between any of328
the categories of MSOA. When we combine our age-stratified analyses and these geographic-spread analyses329
we continue to see a mixed picture: some local authorities have signal of spillover, but some do not. We do330
not see a consistent pattern across England, likely due to wide variations both the course of the coronavirus331
pandemic and the nature of university-community interaction in different local authorities. Considerations such332
as the severity of imposed NPIs, magnitude of student body, and uptake and efficacy of testing, tracing, and333
quarantining measures likely all influence the overall results, but their individual contributions are not identifiable334
in this analysis. There is agreement between the age-stratified and geographic-spread analyses of spillover in e.g.335
Manchester and Birmingham. This supports the robustness of the spillover signals (where observed), and the336
utility of both methods.337
3. Exploratory modelling for future return338
During the autumn term, one of the recurring problems that universities encountered was the large number of339
students that needed to isolate in halls of residence. The isolation was seen as detrimental to the mental health340
of students, but also the sheer number of isolated students posed logistical problems to the universities. For341
instance, making sure that students received adequate food packages was a problem at the beginning of the342
autumn term. It was an ongoing discussion how to reduce the number of students in isolation and to ‘flatten’343
spikes in the number of isolated students to help universities to better deal with these logistical challenges.344
The large outbreaks in universities during the first term led to consideration of methods to safely manage the345
return of students for the second term of the academic year in January 2021. Two constituent components of346
the initial guidance (published on the 2nd December 2020) were the staggered return of students and increased347
usage of rapid tests [6]. Universities were asked to stagger their students returning over a five-week period348
according to course type. Here students in subjects that most required face-to-face interactions, such as medical349
and veterinary students, identified to be the first ones to return to campuses. Guidance also stipulated that all350
students should be offered a SARS-CoV-2 test when they returned to university, helping identify and isolate351
those who were asymptomatic. The protocol involved two lateral flow tests (LFTs), three days apart. In practice,352
however, this staggered return did not occur as planned in January 2021. Following the imposition of a new353
nationwide lockdown on 4th January 2021, there was a prioritisation of return of students to face-to-face teaching354
enrolled on courses that were most important to be delivered in-person in order to support the pipeline of future355
key workers. All other courses were to continue being delivered online [8].356
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In this section, we bring together insights from multiple independent models assessing the impact of staggering357
the return of students to university and mass testing on infection and isolation. The intention of our modelling358
work was to focus purely on unpicking the epidemiological consequences of staggering student return on SARS-359
CoV-2 transmission and isolation. We acknowledge there are multiple factors that administrators must consider360
and there may be operational and/or resource reasons why a staggered return at Higher Education institutions is361
desired. These include ensuring that testing capacity is sufficient to meet demand, the monetary costs associated362
with the intervention (e.g. testing and staffing) and the educational needs of the students. Though the inclusion363
of these considerations is beyond the scope of our study, they are important constituents of a multi-faceted364
decision making process and we provide an expanded discussion in the Conclusions section.365
We present work from four independent models that implement a staggered student return, with the view of366
having multiple approaches (with distinct modelling assumptions) to enhance result robustness and to determine367
whether consensus findings emerged. We open with two parsimonious model frameworks. The first is used to368
highlight potential surges in the number of students in isolation upon student return (Section 3.1). The second369
presents a transmission model that considers the impact of staggered student return over time (Section 3.2). The370
final two models continue the exploration of the dependency of epidemiological outcomes on staggered return371
policies, with both models incorporating heterogeneity in contact structure and being partly parameterised using372
data on (different) individual Higher Education institutions (Section 3.3).373
With respect to mass testing, we consider insights from two network transmission models, each with a differing374
area of focus. One analysis varying the return testing strategy, in conjunction with staggered student return375
(Section 3.4). The other considers regular rounds of testing throughout the academic term and the potential376
implications of a SARS-CoV-2 variant with increased transmissibility, in light of the emergence of the B.1.1.7377
SARS-CoV-2 lineage that proliferated rapidly in the UK in late 2020 and early 2021 [5, 45, 48, 59] (Section 3.5).378
3.1. Impact of staggering on isolation379
To investigate the viability of a staggered return approach, we built a basic discrete event simulation for380
the return of students to their halls of residence. This individual-based model was designed to investigate the381
necessary capacity that would be required on campus to isolate incoming students and to establish whether382
staggering could reduce the overall time that individuals would spend in isolation upon return. In this section,383
we purely focus upon isolation as a result of a positive test upon return and do not consider spread of infection384
within the university after students return.385
3.1.1. Methods. In the model each student arrives in their household and is tested immediately. If their test is386
positive, their household is put into isolation for 10 days. If a particular student is due to arrive in a household387
that is already isolating, that student is required to wait until the relevant household comes out of isolation388
before they are allowed to return and have their test.389
We investigated four different scenarios: (i) all students return on the same day, (ii) each student returns on a390
random day in a 14 day interval, (iii) each student returns on a random day in a 28 day interval, and (iv) the391
students return in three weekend ‘pulses’. In these pulses, we assume that 10% of students are in halls already392
and 40% arrive on the first weekend. The next 30% arrive on the weekend three weeks later and the final 20%393
arrive on the weekend after that. For the purposes of testing, we treat students that are already in halls the394
same as the first arrival group. In all cases, we assume that the students that come back at a certain point in395
time are uniformly distributed over the different households. So, we do not consider effects that appear when,396
for instance, student housing is organised by programme or year. We note that a fully random distribution of397
returns over a longer period might be practically infeasible, and assuming that returns are concentrated on, for398
instance, weekends, is a more plausible assumption.399
We simulated these scenarios for cohorts of 1000 students. We varied the household size and the probability400
of receiving a positive test. The results of these simulations are summarized in Table 5, where we give the401
total number of days that students need to spend in isolation, need to wait before arriving in their term-time402
accommodation, and the peak number of students that were in isolation.403
We note that, from an organisational perspective for student accommodation, not only the total days spent in404
isolation is relevant, but also the number of students that are isolated at any given time.405
3.1.2. Results. To show the impact we have plotted the average numbers for the different simulations in Figs. 5406
to 7 for the random return within 14 days, 28 days, and the three-pulse return.407
We observed that staggering the return of students can have organisational advantages. Under a regime408
where the fraction of positive tests in the student population is low and household sizes are small (Fig. 5, Fig. 6409
and Fig. 7, top left panels), spreading out the return of students can reduce the total number of days that410
students spend in isolation and also reduce the peak number of students that are isolated on a given day. These411
advantages diminish or are even reversed if the proportion of positive tests is high (Fig. 5, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7,412
bottom rows); in that case households are repeatedly put in isolation, which leads to higher peaks and total days413
in isolation. As can be seen in the case of household sizes of 20 students and positive test probability of 0.05,414
spreading the return of students over a longer period of time mainly reduces the peak number of isolations and415
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Figure 5. Expected number of students in isolation against time for a return spread over 14 days
when the probability of a returning student being infected, p, is 0.01 (top row), 0.02 (middle row)
and 0.05 (bottom row) for household sizes of 10 individuals (left column) and 20 individuals (right
column). (Waiting (blue), Isolating (orange), W+I: Waiting + Isolating (green), bands show 95%
interval computed from 100 simulation runs).
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Figure 6. Expected number of students in isolation against time for a return spread over 28 days
when the probability of a returning student being infected, p, is 0.01 (top row), 0.02 (middle row)
and 0.05 (bottom row) for household sizes of 10 individuals (left column) and 20 individuals (right
column). (Waiting (blue), Isolating (orange), W+I: Waiting + Isolating (green), bands show 95%
interval computed from 100 simulation runs).
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Figure 7. Expected isolations for a three week pulse return when the probability of a returning student
being infected, p, is 0.01 (top row), 0.02 (middle row) and 0.05 (bottom row) for household sizes of 10
individuals (left column) and 20 individuals (right column). (Waiting (blue), Isolating (orange), W+I:
Waiting + Isolating (green), bands show 95% interval computed from 100 simulation runs).
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Table 5. Summary of the staggering simulations. The table shows the average over 100 runs for
each combination of household size and fraction of positive tests (3WP: Three week pulsed return, p:
probability of positive test result).
Household Size p Arrival Isolating Waiting W+I Peak Isolating
10 0.01 3WP 621 99 720 102
At start 931 0 931 170
Random14 594 218 812 94
Random28 577 129 706 89
0.02 3WP 1183 186 1369 170
At start 1812 0 1812 320
Random14 1152 401 1553 178
Random28 1171 255 1426 116
0.05 3WP 2908 438 3346 303
At start 4049 0 4049 510
Random14 2868 951 3819 307
Random28 2793 595 3387 256
20 0.01 3WP 1190 187 1378 184
At start 1806 0 1806 320
Random14 1151 435 1586 183
Random28 1048 250 1299 167
0.02 3WP 2328 383 2712 279
At start 3224 0 3224 500
Random14 2275 815 3090 302
Random28 2103 494 2597 228
0.05 3WP 5512 875 6387 520
At start 6352 0 6352 780
Random14 5408 1757 7165 552
Random28 5198 1214 6412 512
does not contribute significantly to a reduction in the total number of days that students are isolated in these416
scenarios. We note that for positive test probabilities of p = 0.02 and p = 0.05, one can expect that a significant417
number of students will be impacted by isolation measures in the first weeks after return. Hence, these results418
suggest that it is important to take this lead time into account when planning in-person teaching activities.419
3.2. A simple model for the impact of a staggered student return on incidence420
We provide an analysis of the impact of a staggered return of students in three stages, on the transmission421
dynamics during an academic term.422
3.2.1. Methods. We implement staggered return of students in a simple compartmental transmission model423
that segments hosts into susceptible (S), infectious (I) and recovered (R) classes, and examine the mean field424
solutions of this SIR model. We assume that the students return to university in three stages over three weeks.425
On return, they mix freely with the existing student body and with each other. At each return point we assume426
that a fixed proportion of the returnees are infected.427
In our simulation we took a student body of N students. These returned in groups of N/3 in weeks one, two428
and three, so that the respective student populations in the first three weeks were N/3, 2N/3 and N . Once all429
of the students return they remain at university for a further eight weeks until the end of an 11 week term.430
At each return point we assume that a fixed proportion, p, of the returnees were infected. In full, when431
each group of N/3 students returned they were assumed to contribute pN/3 students to the number of infected432
students, and (1  p)N/3 students to the susceptibles. The resulting SIR model is then given by the following433
three-level piece-wise model, where t = [0 . . . 77] was measured in days, i = 1 gave the infection dynamics in434















In each of the three stages, the population values were: N1 = N/3, N2 = 2N/3 and N3 = N.436
To simulate the staggered returns we took the values of S and I at the start of the first, second and third
weeks to be the following, noting that the values of S and I then jump at the start of each week (as can be seen
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Figure 8. Staggered/unstaggered return temporal profiles. Left: Three student returns in the
first three weeks, taking N = 1000 and   = 0.18, p = 0.1,   = 0.072, with an initial value of R = 2.25.
Right: Unstaggered return. In each figure we show S (blue), I (red) and R (yellow).
Figure 9. Staggered/unstaggered return temporal profiles.   = 0.18, p = 0.02, initial R = 2.45
in the figures):
S1(0) = (1  p)N/3, I1(0) = pN/3,
S2(7) = S1(7) + (1  p)N/3, I2(7) = I1(7) + pN/3,
S3(14) = S2(14) + (1  p)N/3, I3(14) = I2(14) + pN/3.
For simulation examples we used a population size of N = 1000 and considered three scenarios with different437
values of the prevalence (p) and transmissibility ( ): (i) p = 0.10,  = 0.18; (ii) p = 0.02,  = 0.18; (iii)438
p = 0.02,  = 0.30. In all scenarios we fixed the recovery rate   = 0.072. We also compared the results of the439
‘staggering’ model with that of an unstaggered model (with the same parameter values) in which all of the N440
students returned at the start of term.441
3.2.2. Results. The corresponding reproduction numbers R for the three scenarios are initially: (i) R =442
2.5, (ii)R = 2.45 and (iii) R = 4.08.443
In the absence of all other controls, and across all three considered scenarios, we observed that staggering can444
slightly reduce and slightly delay the size of the infection peak in the short term (Figs. 8 to 10). However, over445
the course of the 11 week term the reductions in the overall attack rate were minor, particularly for infections446
with high transmissibility (Fig. 10).447
Whilst based on relatively simple assumptions, these results are intuitive. In conclusion (i) a staggered return448
could delay and reduce the outbreak peak and (ii) however without other controls, staggering will not much449
reduce the overall attack rate over the course of an academic term.450
3.3. Structured models assessing the impact of a staggered student return451
The formerly presented parsimonious models provide guiding principles on the potential impact of staggering452
on infection throughout the course of an academic term and isolation upon return. In this section, we build on453
the prior work by investigating the role of staggered student return on epidemiological outcomes using models454
incorporating additional layers of complexity. In contrast to the compartmental model in Section 3.2, these455
models are simulated probabilistically to explore the random/stochastic variation in outcomes. Specifically,456
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Figure 10. Staggered/unstaggered return temporal profiles.   = 0.3, p = 0.02, initial R = 4.08
we used two models of transmission dynamics for SARS-CoV-2 in a university setting, each using a different457
model conceptualisation: (i) a stochastic compartmental model [2] and (ii) a network-based model [21]. Both458
transmission models assume that upon exposure hosts enter a period of latent infection during which they are not459
infectious, then hosts may remain asymptomatic throughout their infection (asymptomatic cases) or transition460
through presymptomatic and symptomatic stages of infection. Mass asymptomatic testing may detect both461
presymptomatically infected hosts and asymptomatic cases. Note that both models assumed that individuals462
did not ‘compensate’ by replacing contacts that were unable to occur (due to the expected contact being in463
isolation or not having yet returned to the university setting).464
3.3.1. Methods.465
Stochastic compartmental model summary. The stochastic compartmental model included realistic mixing466
patterns for students based on student responses to the Social Contact Survey conducted in 2010 [3, 4]. These467
contact matrices entailed 160 groups based on school (department) and year of study, with contacts stratified into468
household, study and random contacts. We calibrated the disease compartments to estimations made at the start469
of the 2020/2021 academic year in the absence of controls, returning an R of approximately 3 (for calibration we470
assumed asymptomatic cases were 50% less infectious than symptomatic cases). Further model details, including471
descriptions of the remaining assumptions underpinning the model, may be found in Brooks-Pollock et al. [2].472
For our analysis here, we fixed the mean probability of a case being asymptomatic at 75% and the relative473
infectiousness of an asymptomatic we varied between 0 and 1. It was assumed that the university would operate474
within Public Health England guidelines and therefore that symptomatic cases would be tested and self-isolate475
within 48 hours. Students in large halls of residence were assumed to be restricted to households of 24 individuals,476
reflecting actions taken by universities in the 2020/2021 academic year. We did not include the impact of contact477
tracing, social distancing or the use of face coverings. We used a student population size of 28,000. The number478
of infected students at the start of term was estimated using home location and incidence as of July 2020 as479
described in Brooks-Pollock et al. [2] using an anonymised extract of student data for a specific university relating480
to the 2019/2020 academic year. The study complied with the University data protection policy for research481
studies [55]. Each scenario was run for a simulated 300 days, with 10 replicates per scenario.482
The model is coded in R and C++ and available at https://github.com/ellen-is/unimodel.483
Network model summary. Our network model framework represents interactions between students within a484
university population in different settings (household, study cohort, organised societies and sports clubs, other485
social). We ran an epidemic process on this network, for the virus SARS-CoV-2. The model includes isolation and486
contact tracing. We adopted a pessimistic approach by assuming a comparable amount of mixing to pre-pandemic487
circumstances, and did not include any reduction in the risk of transmission occurring over contacts due to social488
distancing and/or the use of face coverings.489
Specifically, we assumed students had contact with all household members each day. We sampled the490
number of non-household contacts from distributions fit to data informed by student responses to the Social491
Contact Survey conducted in 2010 [3, 4], with stratification according to the level of study (undergraduate492
or postgraduate). For this analysis, we then applied the following two contact pattern changes to all but the493
baseline (no intervention) scenario: (i) society contacts did not occur (transmission risk therefore zero), assuming494
that all meetings would take place online; (ii) for on-campus resident students, we assumed no contacts within495
the broader accommodation unit of the same floor or block of residence (thus outside the immediate household).496
In all simulations we had an overall student population of 25,000, with 7,155 students resident on-campus497
and the remainder off-campus. Each simulation run had a duration of 11 weeks, encompassing both a ten week498
academic term and the week prior to its commencement.499
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Three weekend pulse (Stoch. comp. model)
Three weekend pulse (Network model)
Figure 11. Staggered return temporal profiles. We considered four student return patterns: no
stagger (blue solid line); return spread over 14 days (orange dashed line); return spread over 28 days
(yellow dotted line); three weekend pulsed return (by course), as used in the stochastic compartmental
model (purple dot-dash line); three weekend pulsed return, as used in the network model (green dot-dash
line, cross markers). For this depiction, we present proportion returned with respect to time when
assuming 10% of all students were resident in their university accommodation between academic terms.
We initialised latent, infectious (asymptomatic, presymptomatic and symptomatic) and recovered individuals500
using estimates for 2nd January 2021 from the University of Warwick SARS-CoV-2 transmission model [26],501
based on fits from the 29th November 2020 and assuming no change to adherence in NPIs.502
For each parameter configuration we ran 1,000 simulations, amalgamating 50 batches of 20 replicates; each503
batch of 20 replicates was obtained using a distinct network realisation. We performed the model simulations504
in Julia v1.4 - 1.5. The data and science surrounding the SARS-Cov-2 infection is fast moving. This piece of505
sub-analysis was originally undertaken in December 2020, with our intent being for this work to provide a record506
of the state of our modelling at that time. For a full description of the network model and noted limitations of507
the methodology, see Hill et al. [21]. We summarise in Appendix D other changes made from the base model to508
carry out this analysis. Distributions of outcome measures are visualised using violin plots which capture the509
smoothed probability density of a set of numeric values [61].510
Staggered return strategies. We assessed four strategies for the return of students for the academic term (Fig. 11)511
using the stochastic compartmental model and the network-based model. Note that, across all considered512
strategies, a proportion of the student population was considered to be resident in university accommodation513
between academic terms.514
The four strategies were as follows: (i) No stagger – for students not resident in university accommodation over515
the vacation, they return on day one. All students entered the return test procedure on day one (we acknowledge516
that in practice there would be logistic difficulties associated with such a strategy); (ii) 14 day spread – each517
student is allocated their day to return to university (if applicable) and they begin the return testing procedure518
between days 1 and 14 (sampled according to a uniform distribution); (iii) 28 day spread – similar to the 14519
day spread strategy, except the applicable range spans days 1 to 28; (iv) Three weekend pulse (by course) –520
fractions of the student population return on designated weekends based on level and course of study. In the521
stochastic compartmental model, for the three weekend pulse, on day 1 of the simulation we assumed that all522
vital medical, dental and veterinary students enrolled in courses (as provided by the University of Bristol [54])523
were present, as well as 20% of students in all other schools, giving 31% of students present at university in524
total. This first group of students was chosen because they were studying on the courses that were allowed to525
return when universities were closed in January 2021 and at this time it was estimated that 20% of students526
who were not enrolled on these courses still chose to return. On day 22 of the simulation, all other courses with527
important practical elements return to university, giving a total of 51% of students present at university. On day528
29, all remaining students return to university. For the network model, we set the groupings (and the associated529
proportion of students returned) for the three weekend pulse as a variation on the University of Warwick plan530
for staggering student return [57].531
Testing protocols. We also included a testing protocol that adherent students engaged with upon return to532
university. In the stochastic compartmental model, we considered two scenarios: (i) no testing on student return;533
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Testing of asymptomatics− 100% uptake
Figure 12. Epidemiological outcomes amongst a student population given differing
staggered return strategies to university using a stochastic compartmental model. Outputs
are summarised from ten simulations, with the lines representing the median number of symptomatic
and asymptomatic students and the shaded areas showing the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. We dis-
play distributions corresponding to: (a) no testing of asymptomatics upon student return; (b) all
asymptomatics are tested.
(ii) testing of all non-symptomatics. We assumed the tests detect half of true positives (50% sensitivity) and do534
not generate false positive results (100% specificity).535
In the network model, we assumed adherent students underwent two LFTs, three days apart, with isolation536
between tests (for details on test sensitivity and specificity, see Appendix D). For each strategy for student537
return, we sampled the proportion of students that were adherent to isolation from zero compliance (value 0)538
to full compliance (value 1) in increments of 0.1. We assumed an identical adherence to isolation restrictions539
independent of the cause (presence of symptoms, household member displaying symptoms, identified as a close540
contact of an infected by contact tracing). Additionally, we assumed those that would engage with isolation541
measures would also engage with contact tracing.542
3.3.2. Results.543
Stochastic compartmental model results. We first present our findings from simulations carried out with the544
stochastic compartmental model. The collection of simulations that we present here give an indication of what545
the impact of staggering and testing might have been at the start of the 2020/2021 academic year, if this had546
taken place. The model parameters do not change based on events that have happened since this time, including547
vacation periods, and consequently the results are to be interpreted qualitatively if used to make predictions548
about future scenarios.549
We observed a similar overall case burden across all considered staggering strategies. Given high adherence to550
control, similar temporal trends were observed regardless of the testing strategy used (Fig. 12). Relative to an551
unstaggered return, there was lower prevalence in the early phase paired with higher prevalence in late phase for552
the 14 day and 28 day strategies, with these relationships being consistent across the collection of test upon553
student return protocols (Fig. 13).554
Network model results. For the independent analysis performed using the network model, on account of the555
inherent uncertainty in several parameters of the model and assumptions made regarding contact patterns,556
we once more focus on qualitative comparisons across the simulated scenarios (as done with the stochastic557
compartmental model). We first note that, compared to the baseline scenario, the scenario with reductions in558
contacts via organised societies and dynamic on-campus accommodation contacts (represented by adherence559
probability 0.0 in Fig. 14) produced a shift downwards in the obtained distributions of relative attack rate560
(medians of 0.93-0.96 across the four staggering strategies).561
Comparing attack rate across staggering strategies for a fixed adherence level, in concordance with the562
stochastic compartment model we found a minimal impact on the attack rate over the course of the academic563
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Three weekend pulse (by course)
Figure 13. Epidemiological outcomes amongst a student population given differing
staggered return strategies to university compared to a strategy where staggering is not
used, using a stochastic compartmental model. Outputs are summarised from 10 simulations,
with the continuous lines representing the median number of symptomatic and asymptomatic students
and the dashed lines corresponding to the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. We display distributions
corresponding to: (a) no testing of asymptomatics upon student return; (b) all asymptomatics are
tested.
term. Furthermore, we determined adherence to isolation guidance and following test and trace procedures as564
crucial in reducing the overall case burden within the student population (Fig. 14a).565
Assessing the potential impact of staggered return strategies on the amount of time students may be required566
to isolate, for a fixed adherence level there were no substantial differences between the strategies we considered567
(Figs. 14b and 14c). Inspecting a measure of time spent in isolation for any given student, we observe an initial568
increase with adherence level, peaking when roughly 70-80% of students are adherent, before declining as it569
approaches all students being adherent (Fig. 14b). A collective response (high adherence) reduced the time each570
adherent student was estimated to spend in isolation, compared to a scenario of moderate adherence amongst571
the student population (Figs. 14b and 14c).572
In the absence of other interventions, staggering slightly reduces and delays the size of the peak, though the573
long term impact is minimal (Fig. 15a). For strong adherence to interventions, temporal trends were found to be574
broadly similar regardless of the staggering strategy used (Fig. 15b), in agreement with the temporal trends575
observed from the stochastic compartmental model projections (Fig. 12).576
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(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 14. Epidemiological outcomes amongst a student population given differing
staggered return strategies to university. Outputs summarised from 1,000 simulations (with
20 runs per network, for 50 network realisations) for various levels of adherence to NPIs. We considered
four strategies: no stagger (blue violin plots); return spread over 14 days (orange violin plots); return
spread over 28 days (yellow violin plots); three weekend pulsed return (purple violin plots). We assumed
100% of adherents engage with return testing. We display distributions corresponding to: (a) relative
attack rate, compared to the baseline scenario; (b) time spent in isolation per student; (c) time spent
in isolation per adherent student. The white markers denote medians and solid black lines span the
25th to 75th percentiles.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 15. Temporal profiles of epidemiological measures over the spring term under
differing return patterns. Outputs produced from 1,000 simulations (with 20 runs per network, for
50 network realisations) for four return patterns: no stagger (blue); return spread over 14 days (orange);
return spread over 28 days (yellow); weekend pulse, gap weekend followed by two further weekend pulses
(purple). Solid lines depict the median profile and shaded regions the 95% prediction interval. Panels
from left-to-right display infection prevalence, cumulative proportion of initial susceptibles infected,
and seven-day averaged R, respectively. (a) No return testing; (b) Return testing with all adherents
participating.
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3.4. Testing on return577
Using the network model described in Section 3.3, we modelled implementation of a testing protocol that578
students would be advised to complete before attending face to face teaching.579
3.4.1. Methods. To investigate the sensitivity of staggered returns to alternative test on return strategies, using a580
fixed high level of adherence (90%), we investigated four protocols (Table 6). Test Protocol A: Two LFTs, three581
days apart, with isolation between tests (the default assumption); Test Protocol B: Single LFT; Test Protocol C:582
Two LFTs, three days apart, with no isolation between tests; Test Protocol D: Single PCR with isolation until583
test result received (two day delay), leaving isolation upon a negative test result.584
Table 6. Overview of the return test protocols. Cells containing an ‘X’ denote the element being a part
of the return test protocol. LFT 1 and LFT 2 correspond to a first and second LFT respectively. Given
the plan included individuals undergoing two LFTs, ‘Isolate between tests’ reflects whether isolation
should occur between the two LFTs.
Testing




A X X X
B X
C X X
D Single PCR test
3.4.2. Results. Given high adherence to interventions and engagement with rapid testing, the inclusion of a585
second LFT and isolation between the LFTs gives minor reductions in attack rate (comparing A–D in Fig. 16).586
We found comparable attack rate distributions across our four (previously introduced) staggering strategies for587
student return to university (comparing between colours in Fig. 16).588
3.5. Testing during term589
To build on our investigation of testing on arrival, we simulated the impact of an asymptomatic testing system590
in use throughout the term assuming the presence of a more transmissible SARS-CoV-2 variant. This scenario591
was considered in response to the emergence of the B.1.1.7 variant in the UK, which began to become widespread592
from November 2020.593
3.5.1. Methods. We used a layered network model of contact between 15,000 simulated students, with one594
layer of household contacts and one of other-group contacts intended to simulate all out-of-household contact.595
Individuals could be infected by either household or non-household contacts. Infected individuals progressed596
through disease states via a stochastic compartmental model including a latent period, various infectious states597
(presymptomatic, asymptomatic, or symptomatic), and recovery with assumed immunity.598
We investigated five during-term asymptomatic testing scenarios, in which individuals were tested at random599
with probability 1/3, 1/7, 1/10, or 1/14 per day (to simulate testing every 3, 7, 10, or 14 days, respectively),600
or not at all. In all scenarios symptomatic individuals are assumed to be tested immediately upon developing601
symptoms. Upon a positive test, the entire household isolates for 14 days. Simplifying assumptions included602
perfect and rapid testing and perfect adherence to testing and isolation. We assumed 50% of non-household603
contacts to be traced and isolated.604
We first ran these scenarios with a lower-transmissibility variant intended to plausibly simulate the variant605
of SARS-CoV-2 circulating in universities in the UK in autumn 2020. We then considered a 1.5 times more606
transmissible variant, intended to simulate a potentially more-transmissible variant such as B.1.1.7, 20I/501Y.V1.607
We initialised each simulation with 100 infectious individuals, and ran the model for 100 timesteps (notionally608
days). For each scenario we performed 100 replicates, each run on a newly generated network. Importantly, we609
chose the particular parameters for this model for a combination of plausibility and simplicity, and some are not610
well-founded in any particular dataset. Details of the model, parameter choices, and limitations are available in611
Appendix E.612
3.5.2. Results. We plot the number of cumulative cases as a time series under the differing testing scenarios for613
the two variants in Fig. 17. In general, more frequent asymptomatic screening better controls cases, with the614
scenario with no asymptomatic screening seeing the largest number of cases. While cases were contained to a615
mean of fewer than 1200 in all scenarios with asymptomatic screening in the less-transmissible setting, this was616
only achieved by the most frequent testing scenario in the more-transmissible setting.617
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Figure 16. Relative attack rate distributions under different test before return to study
procedures, in combination with strategies for staggered student return. Assumed 90%
adhere to isolation, test and trace guidance. For test strategies using two LFTs, the two tests were
spaced three days apart. We considered four student return patterns: no stagger (blue violin plots);
return spread over 14 days (orange violin plots); return spread over 28 days (yellow violin plots); three
weekend pulsed return (purple violin plots). The white markers denote medians and solid black lines
span the 25th to 75th percentiles.
3.5.3. Limitations. This model has many simplifying assumptions and the absolute numbers it produces should618
not be considered in isolation or as an absolute prediction. Some of these limitations include: perfect adherence619
to testing and isolation, no vaccination nor prior immunity, no reactive interventions during the course of the620
simulation, and a speculative network contact structure that has not been trained from data but is instead simply621
a plausible simple structure. In addition, the model did not include a reduction in the risk of transmission622
occurring over contacts due to face covering use or social distancing, however other work [16] suggests that if623
such measures are in place in a university setting and/or if there are moderate levels of immunity, the impact of624
testing is less prominent, highlighting the importance of considering testing in the context of other measures.625
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Figure 17. Temporal profiles of cumulative case counts for a simulated population
of 15,000 students under differing during-term asymptomatic screening scenarios. We
present two scenarios for variant transmissibility: (left) lower-transmissibility variant; (right) higher-
transmissibility variant (1.5 times more transmissible than the lower-transmissibility variant). Output
produced from 100 runs of each scenario, with a new network generated for each replicate; envelopes
show 95% of model runs and solid lines show mean values. Asymptomatic screening scenarios considered
are: no asymptomatic testing (red), each person randomly tested with probability 1/14 (yellow), 1/10
(purple), 1/7 (blue), or 1/3 (green) per day, to simulate testing approximately every 14, 10, 7, or 3 days,
respectively. Note that this model has many limitations, and should be interpreted mainly
qualitatively. See main text for a listing of some limitations.
4. Conclusion626
The mass migration of students at the beginning and end of academic terms, their unique living arrangements627
during term time and unique patterns of social mixing, make them an important population for the spread of628
infectious respiratory illnesses. Despite this, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, there was little data collected629
on outbreaks of infectious disease at universities (although one such dataset collected between October 2007630
and mid-February 2008 has now been published in 2021 [10]) and university students were an understudied631
population. Therefore, at the start of the pandemic there was a limited evidence base to support policy decisions632
around universities. Our study brings together expertise from multiple research groups and presents results from633
multiple statistical and modelling analyses and provides new understanding on infectious disease outbreaks at634
universities and how these could be mitigated.635
An important finding of our study is that adherence to NPIs is likely to have more impact than staggering636
the return of students to university. Survey data suggest that in the autumn term of 2020, students generally637
did have high adherence to NPIs; an Office for National Statistics (ONS) survey found high adherence (90%) to638
social distancing across multiple universities [34]. In addition, a survey of University of Bristol students found639
that 99% of students self-isolated after testing positive for COVID-19 and the majority of survey participants640
reported low contact numbers [32]. However, there was heterogeneity in adherence, with some students reporting641
many contacts and with only 61% of students with cardinal COVID-19 symptoms self-isolating [32]. In future,642
it will be important that students maintain their high levels of adherence and to ensure they have sufficient643
resources to allow them to do so.644
Several of the scenarios presented here have considered the frequency of asymptomatic screening at universities.645
This has been explored in other modelling studies, for example [29] found that monthly screening can reduce646
cumulative incidence by 59% and weekly screening by 87%. We found that increasing the frequency of647
asymptomatic screening is likely to be important in the presence of a more transmissible SARS CoV-2 variant,648
with cases only being able to be maintained below 1200 (mean cumulative over 100 days) when testing occurs649
every 3 days (in a population of 25,000). This finding corroborates with a study that used an agent based model650
to simulate COVID-19 transmission at the University of California San Diego, where larger outbreaks resulted in651
a maximum outbreak size of 158 when asymptomatic screening occurred monthly and 7 when it occurred twice652
weekly [15], but with a much lower impact seen on the average outbreak size when increasing from monthly to653
twice weekly testing, ranging from 1.9 to 1.1 respectively. Brooks Pollock et al. [2] also found that mass testing654
was more effective for higher values of the reproduction number. This highlights the importance of reassessing655
control measures under different variants.656
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We have focused here on COVID-19 risks and mitigation strategies for when students return to university and657
during the university term itself, however, we have covered little on the risk of transmission from infected students658
to private homes at the end of term. Previous modelling work suggests that in an unvaccinated population,659
an infectious student would on average generate just less than one secondary within-household infection, but660
this is dependent on the prevalence in the student population at the time of departure [17]. Although it is661
expected that vaccination will reduce the impact of students returning to private homes at the end of term, the662
UK vaccination program is ongoing and there are particular spatial areas and demographic groups where low663
uptake is expected [14], suggesting that this still may be an important question to consider in future.664
Our analyses and discussions have highlighted several areas that we recommend for further attention. These665
include building a better understanding of determinants of adherence, including attributes that may place666
sub-populations at higher risk (e.g. students in part time employment). Given the need for rapid turnaround of667
our analyses, a persistent challenge is the ability to access data in a timely manner and ensuring any barriers to668
data access have a purpose and are necessary. One mechanism for addressing this data availability issue may669
be a centralised nationwide student testing data resource, which could serve as a hub for anonymised student670
testing data that documents institution and attributes such as type of accommodation.671
We recognise there are prominent factors that we have not addressed here as we have focused directly on672
transmission dynamics, yet should be considered while viewing our results in a broader context. One important673
future research direction is to consider the non-COVID impact of intervention measures. The majority of work to674
date on COVID-19 has focused upon developing intervention policies that seek to minimise the overall number of675
cases, hospital admissions or deaths. However, it is important to acknowledge that any control policy that may676
reduce transmission also has an impact in terms of monetary cost, non-COVID health, mental health and well677
being. An extension to this work could focus upon assessing the direct monetary cost of intervention policies as678
well as the logistical and operational constraints associated with such policies [46, 50]. For example, to sustain a679
regular testing regime at universities under financial, logistical, or structural constraints, mathematical modelling680
suggests that pooling RT-qPCR testing may be a cost-effective method, although this may come with additional681
caveats resulting from the associated reduction in sensitivity (when cases are not detected) and sensitivity (when682
students self-isolate but are not infected) [19]. Additionally, in higher educational settings, it is important to683
consider any impact on teaching and examination schedules as well as mental health and well being of students.684
The models considered here allow for an estimate of the different resources used by the different control strategies.685
In order to determine an optimal intervention, it is crucial to establish the objective of any control policy, noting686
that the objective may not be generalisable across all higher education establishments. Once an objective is687
appropriately defined, any modelling can be specifically tailored to maximise the robustness of any advice offered.688
Furthermore, a growing picture is just beginning to emerge on the prevalence of, and risk factors for, ‘long689
COVID’ symptoms and health complications following coronavirus (COVID-19) infection. An initial set of early690
experimental results collected by the ONS indicates around 1 in 5 respondents testing positive for COVID-19691
exhibit symptoms for a period of 5 weeks or longer, and around 1 in 10 respondents testing positive for COVID-19692
exhibit symptoms for a period of 12 weeks or more [41, 42]. We recognise that the current university closures693
may have significant impact upon student mental health and well-being – across multiple surveys collecting694
information on how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the mental health of students, a consistent outcome695
was above 50% of respondents expressing that their well-being and mental health had become worse [35]. In696
addition, we hope that the ongoing vaccine rollout will provide a level of protection for those most vulnerable to697
severe outcomes, which in turn may alleviate risks associated with possible student to community spread.698
In conclusion, our findings are comprised of three overarching points. Firstly, we observed evidence of spillover699
transmission between Higher Education populations and the wider community in some, but not all, settings.700
Secondly, we would expect reductions in adherence to NPIs (including case and household isolation) to have701
more impact than any marginal benefits generated from a staggered return of students to university. Thirdly,702
the emergence of more transmissible new variants results in impaired effectiveness of mass asymptomatic testing.703
Ultimately, we hope that the work presented here can be used by universities and policy makers to assist in the704
long term strategy of ensuring that students can return safely to their studies at universities in the UK. And705
while we have focused on the national picture in the UK, we also hope our results can offer insights relevant to706
higher education in other countries.707
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Appendix A. A simple outbreak model for university COVID-19 outbreaks962
We postulate in Section 2.1 that the probability, P , that a university experiences a SARS-CoV-2 outbreak is963
given by964
(1) P = 1  pn,
where n is the number of imported cases and p is the probability that an imported case fails to seed an outbreak.965
We tested this hypothesis by using estimates for the number of imported student cases [12] and COVID-19966
case number data for a number of universities for which cumulative case number data was available on the UCU967
covid dashboard [52].968
For a university i with cumulative case number ci, we defined an outbreak if ci > Tu, where Tu is a threshold969
number of cases. We set xi = 1 if a university had experienced an outbreak, and xi = 0 if not.970
The probability mass function for the distribution of outbreaks is given by971
f(x|p) = pn(1 x)(1  pn)x.









{ni(1  xi) log p+ xi log(1  pni)} .
Maximising the log likelihood gives the maximum likelihood estimate p̂ for p. The 100(1   ↵)% confidence974
































using E(xi) = 1  pni .976
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Appendix B. Additional analyses for student hall infection data977
Additional regression results978
Univariate and intermediate multivariate regression results for the household and hall SAR (Section 2.2) are979
summarised in Tables 7 and 8.980
Table 7. Coefficients, and associated p-value and standard error, for the univariate and intermediate
multivariate logistic regression models for hall SAR.
Covariate Coefficient p-value Std. error
Univariate logistic regression: SAR
Hall size 0.0037 <0.0001 0.00006
Constant -2.8388 0.0001 0.1722
Median household size -0.0539 0.0029 0.0181
Constant -1.3218 <0.0001 0.01590
Proportion shared bathroom 0.3541 0.0017 0.1097
Constant -1.9836 <0.0001 0.0822
Proportion medical faculty 0.3511 0.0004 1.7973
Constant -2.5257 <0.0001 0.2238
Multivariate logistic regression: SAR
Hall size 0.0030 <0.0001 0.0007
Median household size 0.0300 0.2458 0.0258
Proportion shared bathroom 0.4141 0.0010 0.1253
Proportion Medical faculty 4.0628 0.0712 2.2521
Constant -3.6647 <0.0001 0.4690
Hall size 0.0030 <0.0001 0.0007
Proportion shared bathroom 0.3977 0.0013 0.1233
Proportion Medical faculty 2.7342 0.1588 1.9402
Constant -3.2354 <0.0001 0.2795
Table 8. Coefficients, and associated p-value and standard error, for the univariate and intermediate
multivariate logistic regression models for household SAR.
Covariate Coefficient p-value Std. error
Univariate logistic regression: SAR
Household size -0.0543 0.1442 0.0372
Constant -2.2885 <0.0001 0.3679
Date of first infection -0.1354 <0.0001 0.0291
Constant -0.8816 0.0272 0.3996
Proportion shared bathroom 0.7472 0.0151 0.3074
Constant -3.3660 <0.0001 0.2730
Multivariate logistic regression: SAR
Household size -0.0743 0.0558 0.0388
Date of first infection -0.1547 <0.0001 0.0305
Proportion shared bathroom 0.9911 0.0015 0.3115
Constant -0.6350 0.2966 0.6084
Stochastic transmission model for hall and household infection981
An alternate method for exploring the role of household and hall size, discussed briefly in Section 2.2, is to982
fit a stochastic transmission model that allows for infection between hall members in addition to household983
members.984
Methods. We first calculated the household size distribution for each hall. We ignore the temporal dynamics985
(setting the infectious period to unity) and simulated the final size of the outbreak using the Sellke construction986
[9] in a population with two levels of mixing, defined by the household infectious contact rate,  H , and the987
global (or hall) infectious contact rate,  G. Motivated by the lack of dependence of household SAR on household988
size (Table 1), we assumed density dependent mixing in households. Contacts at each level were assumed to be989
made at the points of a homogeneous Poisson process. We calculated the probability of a student being infected990
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Figure 18. Results of fitting the model with two levels of mixing to each hall individually, plotted
against hall capacity. Circles indicate expected mean and lines 95% confidence intervals. (a) Probability
of infection due to global infectious contact (b) Probability of infection due to household infectious
contact. (c) Comparison of the total probability of infection after introduction accounting for household
and global infectious contacts compared to the estimated binomial probability of infection given
introduction into a household (black dashed line) (d) Comparison of the probability of infection in a
household by household size for each hall (blue lines) and the output from the binary regression analysis
(black line).
given a single introduction in the hall. Inference was performed for each hall using the Approximate Bayesian991
Computation tutorial in Kypraios et al. [28], assuming Exp(1) priors for  H and  G.992
Results. In Fig. 18a we plot the probability that a student was infected by another within their hall including993
their household (phall = 1   e  GAR) (where AR is the hall attack rate, in this case the number of reported994
confirmed infections with known household). The additional probability of infection from within their household995
is shown as phousehold = 1  e  H in Fig. 18b. In Fig. 18c we plot the probability of infection (ptotal) accounting996
for both household and global infectious contacts within an infected household. This is compared to the binomial997
probability of reporting an infection given a previously reported infection in a household (which does not998
distinguish between halls). Fig. 18d compares the estimated probability of a household reporting an infection for999
each hall to the estimation from the binomial logistic analysis Table 3. There is some indication that global1000
infectious contacts may play a relatively greater role in overall infection risk in the largest halls. However, choices1001
for distributing missing household data, which is ignored for here, will likely influence the relative size of phall1002
and phousehold, as will choices about scaling of mixing intensity with household size.1003
The maximum hall size in this data is approximately 400 students and findings may not generalise to other1004
hall settings or future periods of student return. Other limitations of this approach are the lack of differentiation1005
between symptomatic and asymptomatic infections, pre-existing immunity, or the impact of isolation, so that1006
parameters are interpreted as averages across students in a hall in addition to the caveats arising from the1007
missing data. Furthermore, we assume a single introduction and a closed system of fixed occupancy, so that1008
any imported cases are attributed to infection within the hall. Dedicated household based studies in student1009
residential halls would be valuable for untangling the role of mixing within households, halls and with the1010
community on infection risk in these settings.1011
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Appendix C. Additional information on age-stratified observations1012
Additional observations: age-stratified analysis1013
Methodological details. The numerical interpolation method, and the subsequent calculation of the growth rate1014
of positive cases, is applied to the positive case counts in each LTLA, rescaled by the number of people (falling1015
within the considered age range) estimated to live there. This quantity, c(t), shows a consistent day-of-week1016
effect due to e.g. varying test availability and test seeking behaviour. To account for overdispersion in the data,1017
we assume a quasi-Poisson distribution in the fitting.1018
A smoother %(t) is applied using thin-plate splines, such that c(t) / e%(t)+!i , where !i 8 i 2 [1, 7] is used to1019
apply a fixed effect for each day of the week. The instantaneous growth rate of the cases is simply given by %0(t).1020
This was implemented using a General Additive Model from the R package mgcv with a canonical link [62]. Past1021
examples of this method can be found in [43].1022
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Figure 19. Growth rate among the student-aged and community populations across England. Uni-
versity outbreaks are observed on the national scale, with the higher incidence per population among
those aged 18–24. The community growth rate in cases increased from late September. However, there
was not a statistically significant subsequent increase following the peak in student-aged outbreaks.
Growth rates. Despite the clear spikes in cases among 18-to-24-year-olds across all LTLAs in Fig. 20, the growth1023
rates for community cases are qualitatively very different. In Fig. 20c, the community growth rate mirrors the1024
national trend. In Fig. 20a the growth rate of community cases is higher, and appears to lag after the growth in1025
student-aged cases.1026
In Fig. 20d a qualitatively different scenario emerges, with a marked rise in the growth of community cases1027
following an outbreak among the student-aged population. Finally, in Fig. 20b, the outbreak among 18-to-24-1028
year-olds has no perceptible impact on the growth rate of community cases.1029
Limitations. The estimated growth rates of confirmed cases, and the estimated excess community cases following1030
a large student-aged outbreak, are sensitive to the choice of the spline in the smoother. Changing the spline1031
does not qualitatively alter our conclusions.1032
Appendix D. Additional information on the network-based structured model1033
Test sensitivity1034
The probability of testing positive is likely a function of viral load; while symptomatic and asymptomatic1035
individuals have similar average peak viral loads and proliferation stage durations, their average duration of1036
clearance stages has been observed to differ [27, 53]. Therefore, we used distinct test sensitivity profiles for1037
symptomatic and asymptomatic cases. However, we highlight that this is an area of considerable uncertainty.1038
Future studies detailing the testing probability of asymptomatic individuals, and the specific relationship between1039
viral load and testing probability, would be a valuable contribution to this area.1040
For symptomatic cases, we used posterior median profiles reported by Hellewell et al. [18] of the probability of1041
detecting infection against time since infection, with separate estimates for PCR and lateral flow tests (LFTs).1042
The analysis used cycle threshold (Ct) data from repeat PCR testing of healthcare workers in the SAFER1043
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(d) Salford
Figure 20. Examples of the different types of growth rate patterns observed among student-aged and
community cases. The shaded regions are the 95% confidence intervals for the relevant quantity.
study [22], with infections confirmed by paired serology. The probability of detection by LFT was estimated1044
given an assumption that an LFT would detect infections with a Ct  27.1045
For asymptomatic cases, we assumed that the probability of asymptomatic individuals testing positive is1046
equal to that of symptomatic individuals until the peak of infection, but then decays more rapidly, such that the1047
probability of an asymptomatic individual testing positive at 6.7 days after the peak should equal the probability1048
of a symptomatic individual testing positive at 10.5 days after the peak (corresponding with findings from Kissler1049
et al. [27] who estimated an average duration of clearance of 10.5 days in symptomatic cases versus 6.7 days in1050
asymptomatic cases).1051
The sensitivity of PCR tests when conditioned on having received a positive LFT result may differ from the1052
sensitivity estimates of an independent PCR test. We assumed that individuals receiving a positive LFT result1053
would be certain to return a positive result from the confirmatory PCR test.1054
Test specificity1055
We assumed the specificity of PCR tests to be 100%, in line with the ONS UK COVID-19 Infection Survey1056
indicating the specificity of the utilised PCR tests being in excess of 99.9% [33, 37]). We assumed LFT specificity1057
to be 99.68% [25]. Using LFTs to test entire year groups, false positives would be expected to occur relatively1058
frequently.1059
Model change log1060
We detail here notable parameter changes and additions to the previously presented network model [21].1061
Isolation length. From 14th December 2020, the guidance from the UK government on the period of isolation for1062
contacts of confirmed cases was reduced from 14 days to 10 days. The corresponding periods of isolation have1063
been revised in the model.1064
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Figure 21. Probabilities of testing positive through time for symptomatic and asymp-
tomatic individuals. We assumed that the probability of positive test results being returned in
symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals were equal during the proliferation stage of the virus, but
that the probability of asymptomatic individuals testing positive decayed faster in the clearance stage,
owing to a shorter mean clearance duration of 6.7 days [27] (a) PCR test; (b) LFT.
Infection risk for students awaiting return to university. For susceptibles not yet returned to the university,1065
we computed a daily probability of infection to give a background prevalence of between 0.5%-2% (with an1066
infection duration of 16 days, across latent and infectious periods). We sampled the background prevalence in1067
each simulation replicate from a Uniform(0.005,0.02) distribution.1068
Proportion of individuals who stayed in university accommodation between terms. Student surveys indicated1069
that of the order of 10% of students intended to stay in their university accommodation after the end of the first1070
academic term [35].1071
In each simulation replicate, we sampled the proportion independently for on-campus and off-campus residents1072
from a Uniform(0.05,0.15) distribution, thus ensuring we included uncertainty associated with this quantity1073
across our collection of simulations.1074
Contact patterns. We applied the following two contact pattern changes to all but the baseline (no intervention)1075
scenario: (i) society contacts did not occur (transmission risk therefore zero), with it assumed that all meetings1076
would take place online; (ii) for on-campus resident students, we set a zero probability of a contact being made1077
with an individual within the broader accommodation unit of the same floor or block of residence (thus outside1078
the immediate household).1079
Fraction of previous infecteds with PCR positive test result in the previous 90 days. In each simulation replicate,1080
we sampled the fraction of previous infecteds who had returned a PCR positive test result in the previous 901081
days from a Uniform distribution, Uniform(0.02,0.05).1082
Individuals set as being present in accommodation prior to the start of the simulation entered the return1083
testing procedure in an equivalent way to individuals with later arrival dates, with entry time determined by1084
the relevant staggered student return strategy. For individuals from this group that became symptomatic and1085
received a positive test result in the gap before their envisaged time to begin the return test process, they1086
satisfied the condition of having had a positive PCR result within the previous 90 days and, as a consequence,1087
no longer underwent the return test process.1088
Assumptions for scenarios related to isolation status under staggered return and leaving return testing process.1089
Returning students that have symptoms are by definition non-adherent to guidance. In this situation, for the1090
household the returning student is joining, other adhering household members may enter household isolation.1091
We assumed any such individuals entered isolation for the full 10 day period, irrespective of the date of symptom1092
onset of the symptomatic individual.1093
In the scenario of a student completing the return testing procedure with negative results, that would be1094
entering a household that had household members in isolation due to the presence of a recently confirmed case,1095
the student leaving the return test process would immediately enter household isolation.1096
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Appendix E. Additional information on the asymptomatic screening model1097
For this analysis we used a layered network model of contacts between 15,000 simulated students, with one1098
layer of household contacts and one of other-group contacts intended to simulate all out-of-household contact.1099
We start the simulation with 100 infectious individuals, and run the model for 100 timesteps (notionally days).1100
For each scenario we plot the results of 100 replicates, each run on a newly generated network. Importantly: the1101
particular parameters for this model have been chosen for a combination of plausibility and simplicity, and some1102
are not well-founded in any particular dataset (we attempt to highlight these).1103
Half of the households were of 10 people, and half of 5 people (to simulate a cluster-flat arrangement in large1104
halls, e.g. [56]). Other-group contacts are added in 3000 groups, with 5% of groups of size 40, 30% of size1105
10, 50% of size 5 and 15% of size 3 - these values were chosen to simulate a range of activities, but are not1106
well-founded in data. Results are not sensitive to small perturbations in these group sizes, but are sensitive to1107
large changes in the overall amount of group contact. Within either household or other groups all individuals1108
are assumed to have pairwise contact at all timesteps when the individuals are not isolating.1109
Disease progression and isolation are governed by a stochastic rate-based compartmental model in which1110
individuals can be susceptible, exposed but not yet infectious, presymptomatically infectious, asymptotically1111
infectious, symptomatically infectious, or recovered (and presumed immune). They can also be in these various1112
states and self-isolating with their household. Individuals become exposed when one of their network contacts1113
infect them - here household contacts have a 2.5% per day probability of infecting each of their susceptible1114
household members (note that this is independent of household size), and non-household contacts transmit with1115
1/10th this probability. These probabilities are increased by a factor of 1.5 when simulating a more-transmissible1116
variant. These transmission figures have been chosen for simplicity and to plausibly reflect reasonable within-1117
household attack rates. Where no other citation is given, rates of progression between disease states are1118
round-number versions of the fitted parameters from [1]. Exposed individuals become presymptomatically or1119
asymptomatically infectious at a rate of 0.33/day to give a mean 3-day latent period. Presymptomatically1120
infectious individuals become symptomatic at a rate of 0.5/day to give a mean 2-day presymptomatic period.1121
Symptomatically infectious people recover at a rate of 0.1/day to give a mean symptomatic infectious period1122
of 10 days, a round-number version of the 9.5 days reported in [23]. We do not include hospitalisation or1123
death, as these events are very rare in the young-adult population. Half of infected individuals are assumed to1124
develop symptoms, and half to remain asymptomatic (or non-test-seeking for some other reason). Asymptomatic1125
individuals are infectious for the same mean total period of time as symptomatic individuals, and are equally1126
infectious - predictably the effectiveness of asymptomatic screening is sensitive to this assumption.1127
Both symptomatic and asymptomatic testing are assumed to be perfect and rapid, returning results on the1128
day of testing and giving neither false positives nor false negatives. Symptomatic individuals are assumed to1129
immediately seek testing on the day symptoms develop. When an individual receives a positive test, they1130
and their entire household are assumed to isolate perfectly from all non-household contacts, but continue to1131
interact with household contacts as before. Non-household contacts of test-positives are traced and isolated with1132
probability 0.5.1133
This model is an adaptation of a model originally written to model COVID-19 in Caribbean communities,1134
available at1135
https://github.com/SaraJakubiak/covid19-caribbean-educational-model - the majority of features within that1136
model (including dynamically changing network, age-structure, etc.) are not used here. The adaptation of this1137
code to the HE setting used to produce these results can be found at: https://github.com/magicicada/covid19-1138
caribbean-educational-model/tree/manuscript-INI-HE-group1139
